Issues in U.S.-ROK economic relations by Kiyota, Kozoand & Stern, Robert M.

CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
U.S.-ROK Security Relations
Strategic Abandonment: Alliance Relations in Northeast Asia in the Post-Iraq Era
Daniel Sneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Korea’s Domestic Base for Alliance with the United States
Lee Sook-Jong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
U.S.-ROK Economic Relations
Issues in U.S.-ROK Economic Relations
Kozo Kiyota and Robert Stern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Cultural Integration Between the United States and Korea: Looking Beyond the
Free Trade Agreement
Mo Jongryn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
Can a Deal Be Done? The DPRK Nuclear Question Revisited
Lessons from the North Korean Nuclear Issue
Gregory F. Treverton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89
“Peace in Our Time” at What Cost? Possible Financial and Legal Implications of
Denuclearizing North Korea
Scott Rembrandt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A Real Deal or a Political Masquerade? The North Korean Nuclear Question
Revisited
Lee Jung-hoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
East Asia’s Economic and Security Regionalism: Old Constraints and New Prospects
Turning the Six-Party Talks into a Multilateral Security Framework for
Northeast Asia
Gilbert Rozman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Economic and Security Institution Building in Northeast Asia
Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Korean Soft Power: Transnational Cultural Flows, Korean Film, and Diplomacy
in East Asia
“Guests” of the Dear Leader: Shin Sang-ok, Choi Eun-hee, and North Korea’s
Cultural Crisis
Kim Suk-young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .195
Remember Me, Remember Us, Remember Korea: Hallyu, Flashbacks, and the
Transformation of South Korea Into an Unforgettable Nation
Aaron Han Joon Magnan-Park . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209
         Towards Sustainable Economic & Security Relations in East Asia: U.S. & ROK Policy Options     41
ISSUES IN U.S.-ROK ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Kozo Kiyota and Robert M. Stern *
CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Objectives and Main Features of a Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
III.  Major Provisions of the KORUSFTA Negotiations
IV. Computational Analysis of the KORUSFTA
V. Computational Analysis of Alternative Negotiating Options
VI. Conclusion
* Kozo Kiyota is with Yokohama National University and University of Michi-
gan. Robert M. Stern teaches at the University of Michigan. Professors Kiyota
and Stern would like to thank Jeffrey Nugent for his helpful comments on the
earlier version of this paper and other symposium participants for their com-
ments. Kozo Kiyota gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) 2006 Postdoctoral Fellowships for
Research Abroad.
42 U.S.–Korea Academic Symposium
I. Introduction
This paper builds on Kiyota and Stern (2007), in which we analyzed the economic
effects of a U.S.-Korea free trade agreement (KORUSFTA). In Section II, we review
the objectives and main features of the KORUSFTA as perceived prior to the negotiation
of the agreement. In Section III, we then outline the main features of the actual
KORUSFTA that was concluded at the end of June 2007 and is now awaiting legislative
approval by the authorities in both nations. Section IV summarizes the results of a
modeling study by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC 2007)
that is based on the changes in bilateral tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) that
were actually negotiated in the KORUSFTA. We also present for comparative purposes
our earlier results from Kiyota and Stern (2007) that used the prenegotiations data
and some specially constructed estimates of services barriers. Section V presents
some calculations of the effects of alternative negotiating options that may be
considered especially if it turns out that the KORUSFTA is not approved by either or
both Korea and the United States. Section VI concludes.
II. Objectives and Main Features of a U.S.-Korea
Free Trade Agreement
U.S. Objectives
U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman notified the U.S. House and Senate on 2
February 2006 that the administration intended to initiate free trade negotiations with
the Republic of Korea. Some of the key points mentioned in the notification were as
follows:
• An FTA with Korea will help foster economic growth and create higher-
paying jobs in the United States and enable U.S. companies to increase their
exports of goods and services to Korea and promote bilateral investment.
• An FTA will level the playing field for U.S. exports in Korea by providing
U.S. products treatment comparable with that which Korea has offered its
other FTA partners.
• FTA negotiations will provide a unique opportunity to improve further the
protection that Korea affords to intellectual property, including strengthened
measures in Korea against the illegal online distribution and transmission of
copyrighted works.
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• The FTA will provide for regulatory transparency in trade and investment
matters, including a public comment period, the publication of general
administrative actions, and other appropriate provisions.
• An FTA will help strengthen Korea’s cooperation with the United States in
multilateral and regional trade forums.
• An FTA will further enhance the strong U.S.-Korea regional partnership,
which is a force for stability and development in Asia, cooperation on military
and security matters, and the bolstering of strategic interests in the region.
In pursuing bilateral FTAs, the United States uses a common framework covering the
issues to be negotiated with the partners involved. This framework, which is patterned
after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiated in 1992–93,
has been updated and adapted for the new FTAs negotiated in recent years and
currently in process. Issues to be covered include:
• Trade in goods;
• Customs matters, rules of origin, and enforcement cooperation;
• Sanitary and phytosanitary measures;
• Technical barriers to trade (TBT);
• Intellectual property rights;
• Trade in services;
• Investment;
• Electronic commerce;
• Government procurement;
• Transparency, anticorruption, and regulatory reform;
• Competition;
• Trade remedies;
• Environment;
• Labor; and
• State-to-state dispute settlement.
It is also of interest to cite the U.S. objectives in a KORUSFTA noted in Schott,
Bradford, and Moll (2006, 2–3): For the United States, an FTA with Korea would be
the largest bilateral trade deal since NAFTA, yielding substantial export gains while
also advancing important U.S. foreign policy objectives in East Asia. While this was
true when FTA talks were initially vetted years ago, a number of factors have changed:
• Korea agreed to include agriculture in the pact, including reinstatement of
imports of certain types of U.S. beef, and to liberalize screen quotas by cutting
in half the number of days on which movie theaters must show domestic
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films. From the U.S. perspective, these actions removed important impediments
to launching the FTA talks.
• U.S.-South Korean relations have been strained at times over U.S. military
redeployment and differences over how to respond to North Korean
provocations. An FTA might therefore reinforce the political commitment to
work cooperatively to deal with the security challenges on the Korean
peninsula.
• The U.S. share of Korean imports has been declining owing in part to greater
competition from China, Japan, and the European Union. Although the United
States still accounts for a substantial share of Korea’s imports, a number of
U.S. products and services may still face significant market-access barriers.
• The prospect of a KORUSFTA has apparently attracted support in the U.S.
Congress from members of both parties and may serve to help rebuild the
pro-trade coalition that has become fractured in recent years. Such support
will be essential in addressing the potential problems in the negotiations
involving automobile and beef trade and the potential labor issues involved in
the Kaesong industrial complex in North Korea.
It is evident from the foregoing that a KORUSFTA reflects a myriad of objectives
from the U.S. perspective, with a focus on expanding market access in Korea for
U.S. goods and services and shaping the regulatory environment in Korea to conform
to U.S. principles and institutions.
Korea’s Objectives
According to Choi Seok-young (2006), minister for economic affairs in the embassy
of Korea in Washington:
• The Korea-U.S. FTA will be commercially significant in terms of trade and
foreign direct investment and will serve to further the long-standing regional
and bilateral political and strategic interests of both countries.
• While supportive of the multilateral approach to freer trade, Korea’s position
is being broadened to avoid the opportunity cost of exclusion from the general
trends of FTAs, achieve a level playing field in its foreign markets, and enhance
its international competitiveness.
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• In pursuing FTAs, Korea has followed a multitrack approach in terms of
strategy and has sought comprehensive FTAs in terms of coverage and content
and broad geographic coverage with trading partners.
• It is expected that a U.S.-Korea FTA would contribute significantly to bilateral
trade, increase economic welfare and employment, provide more secure
market access, lock in a variety of domestic reforms, and generate greater
efficiency, productivity, and economic growth. Other countries may in turn be
motivated to pursue preferential trading arrangements with Korea and the
United States.
• Because there will be winners and losers from the integration process, Korea
will seek longer implementation periods for vulnerable sectors, particularly in
agriculture and services, and develop domestic programs for adjustment
assistance.
• Time is of the essence in completing and signing the FTA before the mid-
2007 expiration of the U.S. Trade Promotion Authority Act. The overall package
of the FTA must be balanced in order to receive the necessary domestic
approval in both countries. A high level of political will is therefore needed
throughout the negotiation and ratification process.
Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006, 2) also provide their views on Korea’s FTA objectives.
As they note, Korean interest has been derived mainly from concerns about trade
diversion generated by regional agreements among North American countries and
from the desire for special treatment under trade remedy statutes and dispute settlement
systems comparable with that accorded to the NAFTA signatories. But, more broadly,
the FTA is seen as critical to Korea’s future for two related reasons: first, the Korean
economy will have to undergo a substantial transformation to address the competitive
challenges of China and India and to counter the adverse demographic trends facing
Korean society over the next generation; and, second, Korean officials recognize that
they face a large challenge in achieving their goal of becoming the economic and
financial hub of Northeast Asia. An FTA with the United States is viewed accordingly
as buttressing domestic reform and securing better access to the U.S. market than
their East Asian competitors. On the political front, Korean officials hope that there
will be positive spillover effects from an FTA on the broader bilateral relationship. In
part, they hope that the FTA will produce a better climate for pursuing North-South
trade and stimulating investment and development on the Korean peninsula, including
the Kaesong industrial complex.
Korea’s objectives in seeking an FTA thus reflect a variety of considerations, including
a desire to avoid being left out from the general trend of FTAs, to secure access to
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foreign markets and achieve the static and dynamic benefits of trade liberalization, to
enhance Korea’s global competitiveness, and to strengthen the country’s political and
strategic alliances with the United States.
III. Major Provisions of the KORUSFTA Negotiations
The KORUSFTA was concluded on 30 June 2007, prior to the expiration of the
president’s authority to negotiate trade agreements as specified in U.S. legislation.
The agreement is currently awaiting legislative deliberation in both nations. Korea is
likely to begin the ratification process in December 2007 following the forthcoming
national election. The U.S. Congress approval process will probably be sometime in
2008. The major provisions of the FTA have been summarized in a number of fact
sheets prepared by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in 2007.1 A selection
follows:
The United States concluded historic free trade agreement negotiations
with Korea on April 1, 2007. The KORUS FTA will be the United States’
most commercially significant FTA in 15 years. This comprehensive trade
agreement will eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods
and services, promote economic growth, and enhance trade between
the United States and Korea.
Korea is a trillion-dollar economy and is the United States’ 7th largest
trading partner. In 2006, U.S. goods exports to Korea were $32.5 billion,
an increase of 16.9 percent from the previous year. In 2005, U.S. foreign
direct investment in Korea totaled roughly $18.8 billion and was
concentrated largely in the manufacturing, banking, and wholesale trade
sectors. Korea currently enjoys broad access to the U.S. market, and
the United States is Korea’s third largest market, importing 17 percent
of Korea’s worldwide exported goods.
New Market Access for U.S. Consumer and Industrial Products—Under
the agreement, nearly 95 percent of bilateral trade in consumer and
industrial products becomes duty-free within three years of entry into
force of the agreement, including many key U.S. exports such as industrial
and consumer electronic machinery and parts, auto parts, power
generation equipment, the majority of chemicals, medical and scientific
equipment, motorcycles, and certain wood products. Most remaining
1. For documents relating to the KORUSFTA, see the Web site of the United States Trade Representa-
tive: www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Republic_of_Korea_FTA/Section_Index.html.
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tariffs will be eliminated within 10 years. Korea has also agreed to allow
trade in remanufactured goods under the agreement. This will provide
significant export and investment opportunities for U.S. firms involved
in remanufactured products such as medical equipment, machinery, and
auto parts.
Expanded Markets for U.S. Farmers and Ranchers—More than half
(or $1.6 billion) of current U.S. farm exports to Korea will become duty-
free immediately, including wheat, corn for feed, soybeans for crushing,
hides and skins, and cotton, plus a broad range of high value agricultural
products such as almonds, pistachios, bourbon whiskey, wine, raisins,
grape juice, orange juice, fresh cherries, frozen french fries, frozen orange
juice concentrate, and pet food.
U.S. farm products benefiting from expanded market opportunities with
two-year tariff phase-outs include avocados, lemons, dried prunes, and
sunflower seeds. In addition, U.S. farm products benefiting from expanded
market opportunities with five-year tariff phase-outs include food
preparations, chocolate and chocolate confectionary, sweet corn, sauces
and preparations, other fodder and forage (alfalfa), breads and pastry,
grapefruit, and dried mushrooms.
Increased Access for U.S. Autos—The U.S.-Korea FTA contains an
unprecedented package of provisions designed to ensure that U.S.
automobiles can compete in Korea on a level playing field. Part of that
package is an immediate elimination of Korean tariffs on most U.S.
priority passenger vehicles and trucks. Korea has also agreed to overhaul
its system for taxing cars based on “engine displacement,” including the
Special Consumption Tax, the Annual Vehicle Tax, and the Subway/
Regional Development Bond. In addition, under the FTA, Korea has
committed to address specific auto non-tariff barriers, including current
standards, to ensure they do not impede the market access of U.S. autos,
and to create an Autos Working Group to serve as an early warning
system to address regulatory issues that may develop in the future. Finally,
the agreement contains an innovative expedited dispute settlement process
for auto-related measures that violate the FTA, with a full snapback of
MFN [most-favored-nation] car tariffs in the case of a violation.
Textiles and Apparel: Promoting Cooperation and Benefits—Apparel
products made in South Korea will qualify for preferential treatment
under the agreement if they use U.S. or Korean fabric and yarn, thereby
supporting U.S. fabric and yarn exports and jobs. Customs cooperation
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commitments between the United States and South Korea will allow for
verification of claims of origin or preferential treatment, and denial of
preferential treatment or entry if claims cannot be verified. A special
textile safeguard will provide for temporary tariff relief, if imports under
the agreement prove to be damaging to domestic producers.
Promoting the Competitive Process—Korea will take measures to ensure
that anticompetitive practices by private parties and activities by
government-established monopolies or state enterprises do not undermine
the benefits of the FTA, while ensuring strengthened due process
protections for subjects of competition law enforcement actions, such
as providing an opportunity to present evidence and to be heard, to review
and rebut information, and to cross examine any persons who testify in
administrative hearings of antitrust agencies. In addition, under the
agreement, antitrust agencies must have the authority to enter into
settlement agreements with respondents in administrative and civil
enforcement actions.
Strong Protections for U.S. Investors—The agreement establishes a
stable legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Korea. All forms
of investment are protected under the agreement. U.S. investors will
enjoy in almost all circumstances the right to establish, acquire, and operate
investments in Korea on an equal footing with local investors. Investor
protections will be backed by a transparent, binding international
arbitration mechanism. The investment protections in this FTA are as
strong as in any U.S. FTA to date.
Open Services Markets—Korea vastly improved upon its WTO [World
Trade Organization] commitments in services, providing meaningful
market access commitments that extend across virtually all major service
sectors. Significant progress was made in the area of express delivery
services, where Korea provided greater and more secure access to
international delivery services and charted a course for future reform on
domestic services. Korea also made great strides on legal services,
opening up for the first time to foreign legal consulting services.
Other areas where Korea offered improved access include the following
sectors: research and development, legal, accounting, maintenance and
repair of equipment, education, health, environmental, telecommunications,
audio-visual, and services incidental to mining.
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For financial services, Korea will accord substantial market access and
adopt a negative list approach to financial services regulation, as well as
regulatory reform in important areas such as transparency and regional
integration of data processing. In addition, the FTA contains commitments
by Korea to begin the process to ensure that the same rules and regulations
apply equally to cooperatives selling insurance and Korea Post and private
insurers.
A More Open Broadcast Market for U.S. Audio-Visual Products—Korea
agreed to make significant improvements concerning treatment of
broadcasting and audiovisual services, including by allowing within three
years 100 percent foreign ownership of program providers by U.S. firms,
reducing quotas on animation and film, increasing allowable content from
a single country, and locking in current content quotas in other areas.
An Open and Competitive Telecommunications Market—Korea
committed to permit U.S. controlled companies to own 100 percent of
Korean phone companies, up from a current cap of 49 percent, within
two years. The agreement requires the parties to ensure access to
telecommunications services. In addition, the agreement requires the
parties to ensure that dominant phone companies provide cost-based
interconnection and access to essential facilities, including submarine
cable landing stations. The agreement also establishes groundbreaking
provisions to safeguard operators’ technology choices, particularly in
wireless technologies, where U.S. service and equipment suppliers have
strong competitive advantages.
E-Commerce: Free Trade in the Digital Age—Korea and the United
States agreed to non-discriminatory and duty-free treatment of all digital
products (e.g., software and audio-visual products), whether imported
in physical form or over the Internet, and to principles promoting access
to the Internet to conduct electronic commerce.
Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices—The agreement contains
provisions on pharmaceutical and medical device market access issues
that go far beyond those in other U.S. FTAs. The agreement includes
commitments to improve access to innovative products and to ensure
the transparent, predictable, and non-discriminatory pricing and
reimbursement of innovative and generic pharmaceutical products and
medical devices. In addition, the agreement contains provisions to enhance
ethical business practices, improve the predictability and transparency
of the pricing and reimbursement system, and to establish a Medicines
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and Medical Devices Committee to monitor implementation of
commitments in this area. The agreement also requires Korea to create
an independent mechanism to review pricing and reimbursement
decisions.
Greater Protection for Intellectual Property Rights—The agreement
provides standards for protection and enforcement of a broad range of
intellectual property rights, including trademarks, copyrights, and patents,
which are consistent with U.S. standards and will provide effective
protection and enforcement for emerging technologies.
These standards include state-of-the-art protections for digital products
such as U.S. software, music, text, and videos. Additionally, the
agreement provides for stronger, more comprehensive protection for
patents, trademarks and test data, as well as rules on civil, criminal, and
customs enforcement, and a commitment to establish a patent linkage
system to ensure adequate enforcement of pharmaceutical patent rights.
Commitments and Cooperation to Protect the Environment—The
Agreement commits the parties to effectively enforce their own domestic
environmental laws and adopt, maintain, and implement laws, regulations,
and all other measures to fulfill obligations under the seven covered
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). All obligations under
the Environment Chapter are subject to the same dispute settlement
procedures and enforcement mechanisms as commercial obligations. In
addition, the agreement also requires both parties to implement a process
for public submissions to ensure consideration of civil society views on
the implementation of the Chapter. The agreement is complemented by
an environmental cooperation agreement that provides a framework for
undertaking cooperative activities on a bilateral, regional, and multilateral
basis.
Internationally Recognized Labor Rights—The Agreement includes an
enforceable reciprocal obligation for the countries to adopt and maintain
in their laws and practice the fundamental labor rights as stated in the
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
including a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor. Neither Party
may waive or derogate from laws implementing this obligation in a manner
affecting trade or investment. There is also an enforceable obligation to
effectively enforce labor laws related to those rights and to working
conditions. These labor obligations are subject to the same dispute
settlement procedures and enforcement mechanisms as commercial
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obligations. The Agreement also establishes a Cooperative Mechanism
for the governments to develop cooperative activities aimed at promoting
and advancing fundamental labor rights.
Open and Fair Government Procurement—The government procurement
obligations build and expand on the two countries’ obligations under the
plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). Under
the FTA, Korea will provide U.S. firms with non-discriminatory access
to nine Korean central government entities that are not covered under
the GPA. The FTA will also expand procurement open to U.S. suppliers
by setting a threshold (contract values above which procurement is
opened) that is nearly half the GPA threshold. The FTA also includes
improvements in procurement practices, including reductions in tendering
periods for purchasing commercial goods and services, and improvements
in making procurement notices and other information available
electronically. The FTA provides for a working group on government
procurement to take up any issues, in particular, those related to
information technology.
Increased Transparency—The parties have committed to strong
transparency obligations including commitments by their respective
national governments to publish proposed regulations in advance, allow
a reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations, address
significant substantive comments received, and publish final regulations
in an official journal of national circulation.
Additional transparency obligations are included in a wide range of
chapters, including National Treatment and Market Access for Goods,
Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation, TBT, Cross-Border Trade
in Services, Financial Services, Telecommunications, Labor,
Environment, Competition-Related Matters, and Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Devices.
The agreement’s dispute settlement mechanisms provide for open public
hearings, public access to documents, and the opportunity for third parties
to submit views.
Strengthened Protection against Technical Barriers to Trade—The
Chapter on Technical Barriers to Trade builds upon and reinforces
Korea’s commitments in the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade. Notably, the Chapter goes beyond other TBT chapters in recent
U.S. FTAs through disciplines to promote transparency in the way
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governments develop and apply technical regulations and related
conformity assessment procedures (e.g., testing and certification). The
agreement also contains commitments by the Korean government to
address concerns relating to specific emissions and safety standards
issues. Further, the agreement provides for the establishment of an Autos
Working Group to address regulatory issues that may arise in the future.
Finally, the Chapter establishes a committee mechanism to allow for
quick resolution of problems as they arise, backed by FTA dispute
settlement provisions if needed.
Customs Administration and Rules of Origin—The United States and
Korea have agreed on significant commitments on customs
administration, rules of origin, and origin procedures that will ensure that
the U.S. and Korean private sector stakeholders lock in and maximize
the benefits of the FTA, including provisions on transparency and
publication, efficient release of goods, automation, express shipments,
advance rulings, importer focused origin procedures, and comprehensive
product-specific rules of origin.
Contentious Issues in the KORUSFTA
Schott (2007) identifies a number of contentious issues in the negotiated FTA that are
troublesome from the U.S. standpoint especially. These issues include the auto
provisions, agriculture, services, and the Kaesong industrial complex.
Autos. In the case of autos, Schott (2007, 3) notes that:
The disparity in bilateral trade flows . . . has provoked heated concerns
that continue to echo in the congressional debate on the KORUS FTA-
including a demand issued in March 2007 that the pact include quantitative
indicators to ensure increased U.S. exports to Korea. . . . To some U.S.
observers, the disparity in the volume of Korean exports to the U.S.
market compared with U.S. exports to Korea (150 to 1) is prima facie
evidence of discrimination. They remain skeptical that the KORUS FTA
will provide meaningful market access for U.S. exporters, given the
limited results from attempts over the past two decades to break down
barriers to the Korean auto market. . . . They conclude that U.S. sales
will not increase significantly, and therefore the United States should not
remove its remaining trade restrictions affecting Korean shipments to
the U.S. market.
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The KORUS FTA provisions on autos were a high priority for both
countries. For Korean firms, the primary objective was to secure the
immediate elimination of the small U.S. tariff on passenger vehicles (2.5
percent) [and the phasing out of the 25 percent tariff on light trucks].
For the United States, the goal was to remove the obstacles to market
access in Korea.
Schott (2007, 5) asks:
Are the auto provisions on the KORUS FTA “unbalanced?” In terms of
the requirements to change existing policies, the answer is definitely
yes. Korea is required to lower its barriers to trade and investment much
more than the United States.
Claims that the pact is “unbalanced” because the balance of trade is
one-sided reflect confused economics and confuse the policy debate.
The real issue is whether tariff liberalization and regulatory reform in
Korea will create new export opportunities for U.S. automakers. . . .
The scope and pace of . . . reforms do not provide ironclad guarantees
of increased sales to Korea but the cost advantage alone should generate
higher demand for U.S.-made autos. . . . In terms of what should be
done to restore the health of the U.S. auto industry, FTAs have positive,
albeit limited, medicinal powers. Curing the U.S. industry’s chronic
problems, particularly those related to healthcare and pension costs,
require [sic] domestic policy reforms that should be urgently addressed
by the U.S. Congress.
Agriculture. Schott (p. 6) notes that the most important issues in the agricultural
negotiations were rice for Korea and beef for the United States. Rice was exempted
in the negotiations in deference to Korea’s concern about the potential disruptive
effects of permitting significant imports of rice. With regard to U.S. beef, the main
obstacle has been the Korean ban on imports on health grounds because of some
evidence of the presence of “mad cow” disease. Bilateral discussions are in progress
with regard to the lifting of the import ban, but it remains to be seen how the Korean
authorities will respond. In any event, bilateral agricultural trade is relatively small,
and the coverage and timing of the removal of agricultural trade barriers will apparently
benefit U.S. exporters the most.
Services. As noted in the above summary of the negotiations, significant concessions
were made in liberalizing services barriers, especially for Korea. Schott (p. 8) suggests
that while the United States stands to gain from these concessions, the gains for
Korea may turn out to be the most important effects of the FTA:
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By committing to greater transparency of administrative and regulatory procedures
and by removing obstacles to investment and the provision of services (where
restrictions often raise production and distribution costs for producers of goods and
services alike), the Korean government will help promote a more conducive environment
for investment from both domestic and foreign sources. The ancillary benefits of the
required investment and regulatory reforms, as well as the increased productivity of
services industries, should accrue across the Korean economy.
Kaesong industrial complex. Korea’s position in the negotiations was that it wanted
goods produced in the Kaesong industrial complex to be given preferential treatment
in the FTA. But the United States was opposed, given its opposition to the North
Korean regime because of North Korea’s nuclear stance and its alleged international
financial and other illicit activities. In recognition of the possible future rapprochement
with North Korea, Schott (p. 9) notes that the FTA establishes a committee to “(1)
identify geographic areas that may be designated OPZs [outward processing zones]
on the Korean peninsula]; and (2) develop criteria for evaluating whether goods
produced in OPZs may be considered eligible for FTA preferences.” Schott further
notes that the granting of these preferences raises a question of whether the goods
involved meet the requisite labor standards that are specified in U.S. FTAs and that
U.S. congressional action might be required in granting the preferences.2
The Ratification Process
It is not at all clear when the U.S. Congress will consider the implementing legislation
for the KORUSFTA. A number of other FTAs are on the congressional agenda, each
of which may raise difficult questions given the different interest groups involved and
whether issues of labor rights and national security need to be resolved. Trade legislation
also has to compete with many other and more important legislative issues that the
Congress must consider. But perhaps of greatest significance is the unfolding of the
presidential campaign and the outcome of the various primary elections to be held in
January and February 2008. Under the circumstances, the congressional vote on the
KORUSFTA could come at the earliest sometime in the spring or early summer of
2008 or very possibly in 2009 following the November 2008 presidential election.
The ratification timetable in Korea is also not clear. The Korean government submitted
the KORUSFTA bill on 9 September 2007 to the National Assembly. But the ratification
process may be complicated because there will be two elections in Korea in eight
months: a presidential election in December 2007 and a general election in April 2008.
2. For a comprehensive analysis of the issues posed by the Kaesong industrial complex, see Graham
(2007).
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The general election may be the most important because it is more tied in with the
interests of constituents in the rural and industrial sectors, some of whom may support
or oppose the KORUSFTA. The ratification process is further complicated by the
ongoing negotiations for an FTA with the European Union and possible FTAs with
China, Japan, and other countries. It may well be that the legislators will decide first to
move ahead with the KORUSFTA, possibly to goad the U.S. Congress into more
rapid and favorable action and to expedite the negotiations with other potential FTA
partners.
IV. Computational Analysis of the KORUSFTA
Having reviewed the objectives and main features of the KORUSFTA as perceived
prior to the negotiation of the agreement and the actual KORUSFTA that was
concluded, we now turn to computational analysis of the economic effects of the
KORUSFTA. This analysis will provide some insight into the potential benefits and
costs of the FTA that will in turn be useful to the policymakers in the two countries in
their deliberations of whether to ratify the FTA. We will first review the computational
results of the analysis of the KORUSFTA reported in USITC (2007). We will then
review our earlier computational results of the KORUSFTA reported in Kiyota and
Stern (2007). Before we consider the computational results, it will be useful to provide
some commentary on the use and interpretation of computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models.
CGE Modeling
CGE models provide an economy-wide framework for analysis that takes into account
the interdependencies that exist both within and between countries. The framework
is essentially microeconomic in character. When combined with data covering the
sectoral production, trade, and employment of the component countries together with
measures of import tariffs and other forms of trade barriers, it is possible then to
simulate the economic effects of various patterns of trade liberalization. The
computational results based on the model simulations will then provide estimates of
the effects of trade liberalization on aggregate economic welfare for individual countries
together with the impacts on production, trade, and employment at the sectoral levels.
It is important to understand that the CGE modeling simulation results provide indications
of the potential economic changes involved. In this respect, they are not meant to be
empirical forecasts or predictions of the changes because they are not derived from
econometric methods that can yield statistically based estimations. Further, because
they are microeconomic in character, CGE models of necessity abstract from the
macroeconomic forces at work at the aggregate level in individual countries. As a
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consequence, it may be very difficult to compare CGE modeling results with the
actual changes that occur in the economic variables over given periods of time. A
further important consideration is that CGE models used to analyze the effects of
trade liberalization may differ because of the assumptions that characterize their
framework. In any event, CGE modeling results are therefore to be interpreted as the
potential effects of trade liberalization at the microeconomic level, holding
macroeconomic influences constant. The magnitudes and directions of change indicated
by the CGE models are thus very useful in their own right, subject to the caveats just
mentioned.
As noted in Kiyota and Stern (2007), many studies of a KORUSFTA have relied on
what is commonly referred to as a GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model,
using different versions of the GTAP database and base year. Typical GTAP models
rely on a structure of perfect competition with constant returns to scale and assume
that products can be distinguished by national origin. This latter assumption is often
called the Armington assumption, and, conceptually, it affords countries elements of
monopoly power that is reflected in their tariff rates. As a result, when tariffs are
reduced in this framework, there may be large terms-of-trade effects as the assumed
monopoly power is eroded. In our judgment, GTAP models may therefore yield results
that are not altogether plausible because of their reliance on the Armington assumption
of national product differentiation. As we note below, the Michigan Model of World
Production and Trade, which we have used for our computational analysis, contains
features of imperfect competition and product differentiation at the firm level that are
not typically captured by GTAP-based models. The Michigan Model thus does not
exhibit the often large terms-of-trade effects associated with GTAP-based models.
USITC Analysis of the KORUSFTA
The USITC (2007) report assesses the likely impact of the KORUSFTA on the U.S.
economy as a whole and on specific industry sectors. A GTAP-type model has been
used, consisting of 54 sectors—40 merchandise and 14 service sectors—and 10
countries, including the United States and Korea. The model permits measurement of
the effects of the actually negotiated KORUSFTA tariffs and quota reductions on
aggregate economic sectors and labor markets. The standard GTAP model in current
use is based on data for 2001. The USITC model was updated to reflect the state of
the economy in 2005 and then projected to 2008, when the FTA is assumed to take
effect. The CGE model-based analysis was supplemented with analysis of sector-
specific market access provisions, services, and the impact of trade facilitation measures
and regulatory environment provisions. The supplemental analyses were qualitative
rather than quantitative because of data limitations.
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USITC (2007, 2-5–2-6) computational results indicate that the removal of the tariffs
and TRQs specified in the FTA would increase U.S. aggregate economic welfare by
$1.8–2.1 billion, which is less than 0.05 percent of 2008 projected GDP.3 By far the
largest gain comes from improved terms of trade, which, as noted, is characteristic of
GTAP models. The estimated changes in trade flows caused by the KORUSFTA
(USITC 2007, 2-9) are an increase in U.S. exports to Korea of $9.7–10.1 billion and
U.S. imports from Korea of $6.4–6.9 billion. U.S. exports to the world are estimated
(p. 2-14) to increase by $4.8–5.3 billion and imports from the world by $2.8–3.1
billion. U.S.-Korea bilateral trade thus increases more than U.S. trade with the world
as the result of the KORUSFTA. Finally, the USITC model suggests (p. 2-15) that
the KORUSFTA will have modest effects on output or employment for most sectors
in the U.S. economy. It is noteworthy that the USITC study does not report welfare,
trade, and output and employment effects for Korea even though these effects could
be obtained from the model simulations.
Kiyota and Stern Analysis of the KORUSFTA
It is of interest to consider for comparative purposes the modeling results of Kiyota
and Stern (2007), based on the Michigan Model of World Production. This comparison
is limited, however, because Kiyota and Stern used the data adapted from the GTAP
2001 database together with specially constructed measures of services barriers for
computational purposes, whereas the USITC (2007) study has used measures of the
actual changes in tariff rates and TRQs that were negotiated in the KORUSFTA.4
Keeping the differences in mind, the Kiyota and Stern results may nonetheless be of
interest in their own right.
The version of the Michigan Model that Kiyota and Stern used covered 27 economic
sectors, including agriculture, manufactures, and services, in each of 30 countries or
regions.5 The distinguishing feature of the Michigan Model is that it incorporates
some aspects of trade with imperfect competition, including increasing returns to
3. It is interesting to note that an earlier USITC study (McDaniel and Fox 2001) used a GTAP model
comprising 5 regions and 10 sectors and a base year of 1995; then it was estimated that U.S. economic
welfare would increase by $19.6 billion (0.23 percent of GDP), and Korean economic welfare would
increase by $3.9 billion (0.69 percent of GDP) as of 2005.
4. Kiyota and Stern focused on the removal of trade barriers. Other issues such as rules of origin,
intellectual property rights, environmental issues, and labor rights are difficult to quantify and are
therefore not covered in the analysis.
5. North Korea is not available in the current GTAP database and, therefore, is included as part of the rest
of the world.
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scale, monopolistic competition, and product variety.6 Details of the Michigan Model
are available in Deardorff and Stern (1990, especially 9–46) and Brown and Stern
(1989a, 1989b).7
The effects of the combined U.S.-Korea bilateral liberalization of agricultural protection,
manufactures, and services are shown in columns (9) and (10) of Table 1. U.S.
welfare increases by $25.12 billion (0.14 percent of GDP), and Korea’s welfare
increases by $9.28 billion (1.26 percent of GDP). Most of the other countries or
regions show small, positive increases in welfare. Global economic welfare rises by
$41.04 billion. These results are in contrast with the magnitudes of the welfare effects
generated in the USITC (2007) study based on the GTAP framework, making
allowance as mentioned that the USITC study has used the actually negotiated changes
in bilateral trade barriers. The effects of bilateral services liberalization noted in columns
(7) and (8) of Table 1 are considerably larger compared with the agricultural and
manufactures liberalization, suggesting that the greatest gains from the KORUSFTA
may come from services liberalization.
The changes in U.S. exports and imports arising from the FTA are indicated in the
first four columns of Table 2. Total exports and imports increase by $7.8 billion.
Agricultural exports increase by $1.6 billion; food, beverages, and tobacco by $1
billion; manufactures by $2.6 billion; and services by $2.5 billion. There are negligible
imports of agricultural products, imports of manufactures increase by $4.9 billion, and
imports of services increase by $2.6 billion. These changes in U.S. trade are not
materially different from those reported in the USITC (2007) study.
Changes in the value of output are indicated in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 2.
It is evident that output expands in all of the agricultural sectors; food, beverages, and
tobacco; chemicals; nonmetallic mineral products; machinery and equipment; other
manufactures; and other private services. Output declines especially in textiles and
wearing apparel. These results are similarly small compared with the USITC (2007)
output results.
Changes in employment shown in the seventh and eighth columns in Table 2 mirror
the changes in output. It appears that employment is shifted to the expansion of the
agricultural sectors and food, beverages, and tobacco, and away from most of the
6. In the real world, the various effects occur over time, some of them more quickly than others.
However, the Michigan Model is static in the sense that it is based on a single set of equilibrium
conditions rather than relationships that vary over time. It is not feasible therefore to use the model to
analyze the speed of adjustment to the new equilibrium.
7. A more complete description of the formal structure and equations of the model can be found on line
at www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model/.
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manufacturing sectors and from services. But the employment changes noted are all
comparatively small in percentage terms, which is again similar to the results reported
in the USITC (2007) study. It should be noted that the employment changes sum to
zero because of the assumption of full employment of the fixed labor supply.8 That is,
there will be positive and negative shifts in employment that balance out for the economy
as a whole.
The changes in Korea’s exports and imports arising from the FTA are indicated in
Table 3. Korea has minor changes in its agricultural exports. Its exports of manufactures
increase by $6.3 billion and services by $2.3 billion. Korea’s imports of agricultural
products and food, beverages, and tobacco increase by $1.7 billion, manufactures by
$3.7 billion, and services by $2.9 billion. There are noticeably large increases in output
and employment in textiles, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, and
transportation equipment and declines in the other manufacturing sectors and in
services. The employment changes thus reflect the shift of labor from the more capital-
intensive to the relatively labor-intensive manufacturing sectors, and the changes are
large enough to suggest that adjustment problems may be encountered depending on
how rapidly the bilateral barriers would be removed.
Table 4 provides an indication of the changes in the bilateral trade flows in all the
countries and regions of the model in response to the KORUSFTA.9 U.S. bilateral
exports to Korea increase by $9.2 billion but decline across all other countries and
regions as trade diversion takes place. U.S. imports from Korea increase by $6.9
billion, and there are increased U.S. imports from several other trading partners and
small reductions in imports from a number of other countries. Korea’s bilateral exports
increase to most of its trading partners. Its bilateral imports from the United States
increase, but its imports decline from most of its trading partners, again indicating the
presence of trade diversion.
It is evident from Tables 1–4 that the Michigan Model generates potential effects of
the KORUSFTA that differ significantly in a number of respects from the effects
reported in the USITC (2007) study. These differences no doubt reflect the fact that
8. The Michigan Model assumes that any initial trade imbalance remains constant as trade barriers are
changed and exchange rates adjust. The model also assumes that there are no nominal rigidities. There-
fore, there is no role for a real exchange rate mechanism.
9. The following abbreviations are used in Table 4: JPN = Japan, USA = United States, EUN = EU and
EFTA, CAN = Canada, AUS = Australia, NZL = New Zealand, HKG = Hong Kong, KOR = Korea, SGP
= Singapore, TWN = Taiwan, CHN = China, IND = India, IDN = Indonesia, MYS = Malaysia, PHL =
Philippines, THA = Thailand, VNM = Vietnam, RUS = Russia, TUR = Turkey, MEX = Mexico, ARG
= Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, PER = Peru, URY - Uruguay, ROA = Rest
of Asia, XME = Rest of Middle East, CLA = Rest of Central and Latin America, AFR = Africa, ROW =
Rest of world, Imp. = Imports, Exp. = Exports
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the Michigan Model results are based on the pre-negotiation trade barriers. But perhaps
of greater importance is that the Michigan Model takes into account measures of
services barriers and also makes allowance for a variety of aspects of imperfect
competition that are not represented in the USITC model that is based on the assumption
of perfect competition and national product differentiation (Armington assumption).
To shed more light on the differences in data and modeling structures, the authors
plan to use the actually negotiated changes in tariffs and TRQs in the framework of
the Michigan Model. This will provide insight accordingly into why the modeling results
are different and possibly yield a more definitive analysis of the potential effects of
the KORUSFTA.
V. Computational Analysis of Alternative Negotiating Options
Having analyzed the economic effects of the KORUSFTA, we now compare U.S.
and Korean economic interests for other FTAs that the two nations have negotiated
or are in the process of negotiating, and how and whether their interests would be
more or less enhanced by unilateral free trade and global (multilateral) free trade as
compared with the adoption of the KORUSFTA and other bilateral FTAs.10 The
welfare comparisons are indicated in Table 5.
Korean FTAs
The first column of the first page of Table 5 summarizes the welfare effects of the
KORUSFTA and below this the welfare effects of the actual and potential bilateral
FTAs between Korea and a number of partner countries, including Canada, Chile,
Japan, Mexico, and Singapore. It is evident that Korea’s welfare gain from a
KORUSFTA of $9.3 billion is considerably greater than any of the other FTAs listed.
The global welfare increase of $41.0 billion from a KORUSFTA is similarly greater
than the increases of the other FTAs.
The first column of the second page of Table 5 indicates the welfare effects of a
Korea-ASEAN FTA. Korea’s welfare gain of $8.7 billion is similar to the gain from a
KORUSFTA. The global welfare gain of $33.2 billion is less than the $41.0 billion
increase from a KORUSFTA.
U.S. FTAs
The second column of the first page of Table 5 summarizes the welfare effects of
some selected U.S. bilateral FTAs, including those with Australia, Chile, and Singapore
10. For an analysis of Korea’s trade policy options, see Deardorff (2007).
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that are now operative and one with Thailand that is being negotiated. The United
States has also been negotiating bilateral FTAs with several additional countries. The
welfare increase for the United States of $25.1 billion for the KORUSFTA is
substantially greater than the increase for any of the other four countries indicated.
This is the case as well for the global welfare increase of $41.0 billion for the
KORUSFTA as compared with the other bilateral FTAs. These conclusions would
hold for any of the other bilateral FTAs that the United States has negotiated or that
are in process. The first column of the second page Table 5 lists the welfare effects
of regional free trade represented by the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
The U.S. welfare increase of $73.0 billion from the FTAA is about three times greater
than the gain from the bilateral KORUSFTA.
U.S. and Korean Unilateral Liberalization
The bottom of the second column of the first page of Table 5 shows the welfare gains
from unilateral free trade undertaken individually by the United States. The increase
in U.S. welfare with unilateral free trade of $358.9 billion is much greater than the
increase associated with any of the U.S. bilateral and regional FTAs shown in the
table. This is the case as well for the increase in global welfare with U.S. unilateral
free trade. Similarly, Korea’s welfare increase with unilateral free trade of $33.8
billion is greater than the welfare increases of any of the FTAs listed individually and
in total.
Global (Multilateral) Free Trade
The last column of the second page of Table 5 shows the welfare effects of global
free trade. U.S. welfare rises by $614.3 billion and Korea’s welfare rises by $86.1
billion. Global welfare rises by $2.9 trillion. The welfare benefits of global free trade
are therefore much greater than the benefits to be derived from the bilateral FTAs,
regional FTAs, and from unilateral free trade for both the United States and Korea. It
can also be seen that most of the welfare gains from global free trade come from the
elimination of manufactures tariffs and services barriers.
These calculations clearly show that multilateral trade liberalization offers potentially
far greater increases in economic welfare for the United States, Korea, their FTA
partner countries, and the other countries and regions that are covered in the global
trading system. This is the case even if there would be less than complete free trade
globally. That is, if existing trade barriers in the ongoing Doha Development Agenda
negotiations were to be reduced, for example, by one-third or one-half, the resulting
global and national gains would be proportionally lower. But these welfare gains would
still far exceed the welfare gains from the FTAs noted and the gains from the possible
adoption of unilateral free trade by the United States and Korea. This would almost
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certainly remain true even if other benefits stem from the FTAs that have not been
taken into account in the Michigan Model simulations.
VI. Conclusion
We have had occasion in this paper to review the objectives and main features of the
KORUSFTA as perceived prior to the negotiation of the agreement and to outline the
main features of the actual KORUSFTA that was concluded at the end of June 2007
and is now awaiting ratification by the authorities in both nations. We summarized in
particular the results of a modeling study by the USITC (2007) that is based on the
changes in bilateral tariffs and TRQs that were actually negotiated in the KORUSFTA.
We also presented for comparative purposes our earlier results from Kiyota and Stern
(2007) that used the prenegotiations data and some specially constructed estimates of
services barriers. To provide some perspective on KORUSFTA, we presented some
calculations of the effects of alternative negotiating options that may be considered,
especially if it turns out that the KORUSFTA is not approved by either or both Korea
and the United States.
The United States and Korea could realize significant potential benefits from multilateral
trade negotiations. But we know that the Doha Round has been at an impasse for
some years now and could fail. The KORUSFTA might then offer some worthwhile
benefits to the two nations if ratified, and there could be gains from other FTAs as
well. Unilateral liberalization is always an option, but it may be difficult to implement
politically. It will be interesting accordingly to see how the different negotiating options
for the United States and Korea will play out.
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Table 2: Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Change in Exports, Imports,  
Outputs, and Number of Workers for the United States 
 
Industry 
Exports Imports Output 
Employment 
Number of 
workersa 
Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent 
Rice 30 4.8 0 0.3 33 1.1 460 1.1 
Wheat 25 0.4 1 0.2 28 0.2 388 0.2 
Other grains 618 5.8 2 0.2 649 1.6 7,446 1.6 
Vegetables 
and fruits 
99 1.1 13 0.1 83 0.2 1,064 0.2 
Oil seeds 494 4.6 1 0.3 527 1.7 7,151 1.7 
Sugar 0 0.1 0 0.2 4 0.1 67 0.1 
Plant-based 
fibers 
26 0.6 (0) -0.1 6 0.0 63 0.0 
Other crops 185 3.3 16 0.2 193 0.3 3,390 0.3 
Livestock 78 1.1 8 0.1 197 0.1 1,092 0.1 
Other natural 
resources 
10 0.4 2 0.1 8 0.0 (2) -0.0 
Mining 5 0.1 131 0.1 (72) -0.0 (363) -0.0 
Food, 
beverages, 
and tobacco 
1,046 2.0 101 0.2 1,226 0.1 1,880 0.1 
Textiles (19) -0.1 784 1.5 (1,109) -0.4 (4,426) -0.5 
Wearing 
apparel 
(10) -0.1 1,209 1.4 (954) -0.5 (3,482) -0.6 
Leather 
products and 
footwear 
14 0.4 70 0.2 (32) -0.1 (171) -0.2 
Wood and 
wood 
products 
32 0.1 148 0.1 (54) -0.0 (483) -0.0 
Chemicals 784 0.4 434 0.2 490 0.0 119 0.0 
Nonmetallic 
mineral 
products 
149 0.6 43 0.1 104 0.0 289 0.0 
Metal 
products 
157 0.3 288 0.3 (87) -0.0 (1,077) -0.0 
Transportation 
equipment 
51 0.0 1,009 0.3 (704) -0.1 (2,287) -0.1 
Machinery 
and 
equipment 
1,341 0.3 716 0.1 792 0.0 1,438 0.0 
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Table 2: Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Change in Exports, Imports,  
Outputs, and Number of Workers for the United States (continued) 
 
Industry 
Exports Imports Output 
Employment 
Number of 
workersa 
Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent 
Other 
manufactures 
125 0.5 177 0.2 (8) -0.0 (186) -0.0 
Construction (2) -0.1 3 0.1 2 0.0 (68) -0.0 
Electricity, 
gas, and water 
(5) -0.1 2 0.2 20 0.0 (639) -0.0 
Trade and 
transport 
646 0.6 1,043 0.7 (72) -0.0 (5,379) -0.0 
Other private 
services 
1,534 0.8 1,064 0.9 612 0.0 (569) -0.0 
Government 
services 
322 0.4 470 1.3 (344) -0.0 (5,714) -0.0 
Total 7,735  7,735  1,537  0  
 
Source: Authors’ data. 
a Changes in employment sum to zero because of assumption of full  
employment. 
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Table 3: Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Change in Exports, Imports,  
Outputs, and Number of Workers for Korea 
 
Industry 
Exports Imports Output 
Employment 
Number of 
workersa 
Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent 
Rice 0 6.6 36 27.7 380 2.7 23,659 2.7 
Wheat (0) -0.4 39 4.0 17 0.7 512 0.7 
Other grains 0 2.2 161 8.3 (90) -34.7 (4,294) -34.7 
Vegetables 
and fruits 
(5) -1.0 112 22.1 (39) -0.2 (2,317) -0.3 
Oil seeds (0) -0.3 327 34.8 (129) -58.2 (8,655) -58.2 
Sugar 0 0.1 0 2.4 0 1.9 0 1.8 
Plant-based 
fibers 
(0) -1.8 74 8.9 3 4.2 190 4.1 
Other crops (5) -1.1 176 13.6 (120) -3.1 (6,939) -3.1 
Livestock 4 3.9 65 3.4 459 3.5 6,656 3.5 
Other natural 
resources 
1 0.6 18 1.3 79 1.4 289 0.2 
Mining (1) -1.8 386 1.0 (41) -1.3 (317) -1.6 
Food, 
beverages, 
and tobacco 
277 6.9 663 7.6 2,255 3.1 (2,373) -0.7 
Textiles 2,123 8.6 242 3.6 3,942 9.5 29,591 7.6 
Wearing 
apparel 
1,746 27.7 (182) -6.0 2,181 15.5 33,033 13.2 
Leather 
products and 
footwear 
327 7.7 12 0.6 592 8.0 5,168 5.8 
Wood and 
wood 
products 
10 0.2 111 2.0 250 0.7 (1,694) -0.4 
Chemicals 407 1.0 1,034 3.5 1,515 0.9 (1,374) -0.2 
Nonmetallic 
mineral 
products 
4 0.2 170 3.4 (43) -0.2 (2,215) -1.4 
Metal 
products 
94 0.4 357 1.7 283 0.3 (3,556) -0.7 
Transportation 
equipment 
1,244 2.7 243 2.1 1,904 2.0 4,116 0.7 
Machinery 
and 
equipment 
(213) -0.2 1,575 1.8 (841) -0.3 (20,385) -1.4 
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Table 3: Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Change in Exports, Imports,  
Outputs, and Number of Workers for Korea (continued) 
 
Industry 
Exports Imports Output 
Employment 
Number of 
workersa 
Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent 
Other 
manufactures 
261 5.3 112 4.2 287 2.8 1,077 1.4 
Construction 0 0.1 2 1.1 580 1.2 63 0.1 
Electricity, 
gas, and 
water 
(0) -0.1 1 1.4 250 0.3 (4,476) -0.3 
Trade and 
transport 
1,018 7.9 591 2.7 2,783 1.4 (23,553) -0.3 
Other private 
services 
904 6.1 1,837 7.8 1,831 0.6 (9,512) -0.4 
Government 
services 
396 9.7 432 15.8 158 0.1 (12,692) -0.3 
Total 8,594  8,594  18,449  (0)  
 
Source: Authors’ data. 
a Changes in employment sum to zero because of assumption of full  
employment. 
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Table 5: Computation of Welfare Effects of Bilateral FTAs, Unilateral Free  
Trade, and Global Free Trade (billions of dollars and percentage) 
 
Bilateral free trade  Bilateral free trade (continued) 
Korea-U.S. 
Welfare  
U.S.-Australia  
Welfare 
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)  (U.S.$) (% of GDP) 
United States 25.1 0.1   United States 15.7 0.1  
Korea 9.3 1.3   Australia 3.8 0.6  
Global 41.0    Global 18.1   
Korea-Canada 
Welfare  
U.S.-Chile 
Welfare 
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)  (U.S.$) (% of GDP) 
Canada 1.8 0.1   United States 5.5 0.0  
Korea 2.0 0.3   Chile 1.0 0.9  
Global 4.1    Global 6.4   
Korea-Chile 
Welfare  
U.S.-Singapore 
Welfare 
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)  (U.S.$) (% of GDP) 
Chile 0.4 0.3   United States 13.0 0.1  
Korea 0.5 0.1   Singapore 2.0 1.5  
Global 0.7    Global 16.1   
Korea-Japan 
Welfare  
U.S.-Thailand 
Welfare 
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)  (U.S.$) (% of GDP) 
Japan 15.7 0.2   United States 12.4 0.1  
Korea 2.2 0.3   Thailand 5.0 2.5  
Global 18.4    Global 16.3   
Korea-Mexico 
Welfare     
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)  Unilateral free trade   
Mexico 2.2 0.2   
United States 
Welfare 
Korea 2.1 0.3   (U.S.$) (% of GDP) 
Global 3.0    United States 358.9 2.0  
Korea-Singapore 
Welfare  Global 471.8   
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)  
Korea 
Welfare 
Singapore 0.5 0.3   (U.S.$) (% of GDP) 
Korea 0.9 0.1   Korea 33.8 4.6  
Global 1.8     Global 92.4   
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Table 5: Computation of Welfare Effects of Bilateral FTAs, Unilateral Free  
Trade, and Global Free Trade (billions of dollars and percentage) (continued) 
 
Regional free trade 
 
Global free trade
Korea + ASEAN  
Welfare
 
 
Welfare
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)
 
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)
Indonesia 4.5 1.8 
 
United States 614.3 3.4 
Malaysia 5.1 3.3 
 
Korea 86.1 11.7 
Philippines 2.2 1.8 
 
Global 2,857.7  
Singapore 3.1 2.2 
 
Global free trade: Decomposition
Thailand 4.0 2.0 
 Agricultural 
protection 
Welfare
Vietnam 0.8 1.4 
 
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)
Korea 8.7 1.2 
 
United States 19.5 0.1 
Global 33.2  
 
Korea -1.9 -0.3 
FTAA  
Welfare
 
Global 7.8  
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)
 Manufactures 
tariffs 
Welfare
United States 73.0 0.4 
 
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)
Canada 6.2 0.5 
 
United States 85.2 0.5 
Mexico 11.9 1.1 
 
Korea 52.3 7.1 
Argentina 10.7 2.2 
 
Global 965.0  
Brazil 13.5 1.5 
 
Services barriers 
Welfare
Chile 4.0 3.5 
 
(U.S.$) (% of GDP)
Colombia 2.3 2.4 
 
United States 509.6 2.8 
Peru 2.9 1.3 
 
Korea 35.7 4.8 
Uruguay 0.8 2.3 
 
Global 1,885.0  
Rest of FTAA 15.9 2.6 
    
Global 130.1  
    
 


